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Goal-directed behavior is based on representations of contingencies between a
certain situation (S), a certain (re)action (R) and a certain outcome (O). These S-R-
O representations enable flexible response selection in different situations according
to the currently pursued goal. Importantly however, the successful formation of such
representations is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for goal-directed behavior
which additionally requires the actual usage of the contingency information for action
control. The present fMRI study aimed at identifying the neural basis of each of these
two aspects: representing vs. explicitly using experienced S-R-O contingencies. To this
end, we created three experimental conditions: S-R-O contingency present and used
for outcome-based response selection, S-R-O contingency present but not used, and
S-R-O contingency absent. The comparison between conditions with and without S-
R-O contingency revealed that the angular gyrus is relevant for representing S-R-O
contingencies. The explicit usage of learnt S-R-O representations in turn was associated
with increased functional coupling between angular gyrus and several subcortical
(hippocampus, caudate head), prefrontal (lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex (RLPFC)) and cerebellar areas, which we suggest represent different
explicit and implicit processes of goal-directed action control. Hence, we ascribe a
central role to the angular gyrus in associating actions to their sensory outcomes which is
used to guide behavior through coupling of the angular gyrus with multiple areas related
to different aspects of action control.
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Introduction
Goal-directed behavior is characterized by choosing actions according to the outcomes they
produce in a certain situation. Thus, the prerequisite of being able to act in a goal-directed
manner is to have acquired representations of response-outcome relationships in a certain
situation (S-R-O representations), and hence being able to anticipate the future outcome of an
action. However, this representation of an S-R-O relationship alone does not make behavior
goal-directed as, in addition, these representations have to be actually used in order to select
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the response (see also de Wit and Dickinson, 2009). Evidence
for this dissociation of both processes reach back to classic
latent learning experiments with rats (Tolman and Honzik,
1930) demonstrating that S-R-O representations can be acquired
without being used to guide behavior as long as the outcome is
not motivationally relevant. More recent behavioral experiments
in humans also demonstrated that S-R-O representations are
built while their explicit implementation additionally depends on
a goal-directed action control mode (Herwig et al., 2007; Pfister
et al., 2011; Zwosta et al., 2013).
Being able to adjust behavior to the desired consequences
in a certain situation is a core ability of flexible behavior that
is assumed to be impaired in several psychological disorders
such as e.g., obsessive-compulsory disorder (Gillan et al.,
2011) and addiction (Everitt et al., 2008). Yet, in spite of its
behavioral relevance little is known about the neural basis that
enables people to flexibly adjust their behavior to outcomes
they want to reach. In particular, the mere representation
of S-R-O contingencies and their explicit usage have not
been systematically disentangled. However, several candidate
brain regions can be identified from previous neuroimaging
studies that have investigated goal-directed action both in the
ideomotor framework and in the instrumental conditioning
framework (for reviews, see e.g., Wolfensteller and Ruge,
2012; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). While ideomotor learning
accounts investigate goal-directed behavior in terms of sensory
non-incentive outcome anticipations (James, 1890; Greenwald,
1970), instrumental learning accounts focus on the dependence
of actions on incentive outcomes (reward and punishment).
Previous research on ideomotor processes primarily focused on
the passive retrieval of action-outcome associations. Subjects first
engaged in a learning phase during which they contingently
experienced that specific responses were followed by specific
(mostly auditory) outcomes. In a subsequent test phase they
were presented with outcomes that were previously coupled to
a certain response or did not appear in the learning phase. Brain
activation associated to the processing of action outcomes was
found to be higher in the supplementary motor area (SMA) and
hippocampus (Elsner et al., 2002) as well as angular gyrus and
cerebellum (Melcher et al., 2008).
Recently two fMRI studies investigated BOLD activation
dynamics during the learning of contingent vs. non-contingent
action outcomes, both again suggesting an important role of
the angular gyrus. Consistent with ‘‘passive effect priming’’
studies Melcher et al. (2013) found a stronger decrease of
activation across an extended learning phase in the hippocampus
and angular gyrus when effects were contingent on responses.
Angular gyrus activity during learning also predicted the
hippocampal response to outcome stimuli in the test phase,
suggesting that the angular gyrus is involved both in associating
responses and outcomes and in retrieving the response in face
of the outcome. In another recent study, the angular gyrus
(and cerebellum) were also found to be involved in correct
response selection when actions could be chosen according to
specific outcomes, emphasizing the role of this area in the
selection of responses that aim at specific outcomes (Noonan
et al., 2011). The specific role of the angular gyrus in intentional
action selection is further corroborated by the finding that
electrical stimulation of the this area led patients to report motor
intentions without actually performing a movement (Desmurget
et al., 2009).
In a study conducted by Noonan et al. (2011) another area
whose activation was associated to correct response selection of
actions leading to specific outcomes was the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC). Part of this area, the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ)
was also found to be involved in freely chosen actions (compared
to forced choices) (Lau et al., 2004; Mueller et al., 2007) which
suggests an involvement in intentional action selection.
Besides these areas, instrumental conditioning and ideomotor
learning studies consistently suggest the caudate nucleus as
another important brain region for the learning of R-O
associations (Tricomi et al., 2004; Melcher et al., 2013).
Specifically, instrumental conditioning studies suggest that the
caudate nucleus (i.e., dorsomedial striatum) is more involved
in instrumental behavior and the putamen (i.e., dorsolateral
striatum) more in habitual behavior (Yin and Knowlton, 2006;
Balleine et al., 2009; Tricomi et al., 2009). Similarly, during
ideomotor learning, Ruge and Wolfensteller (2013) showed an
involvement of dorsomedial striatum (caudate head) during
the rapid short timescale acquisition of S-R-O associations
together with ventromedial striatum (caudate head and nucleus
accumbens) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) areas.
The aim of the present study was to systematically
investigate the involvement of these areas in representing
S-R-O contingencies on the one hand and in actively using
them in the course of goal-directed response selection on
the other hand. To this end, we compared two conditions
with a hierarchical relationship between stimuli, responses and
outcomes, where R-O contingencies in one stimulus context were
inverted in the other stimulus context, to a control condition
with random outcomes in order to determine activation related
to the representation of S-R-O associations. Additionally, we
manipulated the active usage of these S-R-O representations by
instructing participants either to choose their responses based on
outcomes (hence rendering the outcomemotivationally relevant)
or based on stimulus-response rules (with no reference to the
outcome).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty-three right-handed neurologically and psychiatrically
healthy subjects with normal color vision participated (19
female, mean age: 23.8, SD: 2.9). The experimental protocol was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Technische Universität
Dresden. All participants gave written informed consent prior to
taking part in the experiment and were paid 8e per hour for their
participation.
Experimental Paradigm
We compared three different experimental conditions which
were manipulated within-subject. An outcome-based condition
which included both S-R-O representations as well as their
usage, a stimulus-based condition where S-R-O representations
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were present but not used, and finally a control condition
with random outcomes. By comparing outcome-based and
stimulus-based conditions to a control condition with random
outcomes we could identify brain activation related to S-R-O
representation while comparing the outcome-based with
the stimulus-based condition reflected the active usage of
S-R-O contingencies. For an overview of the conditions, see
Figure 3.
Manipulation of S-R-O Contingency
We employed a task with a hierarchical relationship between
stimuli, responses and specific outcomes, such that R-O
contingencies in one context were inverted in the other context
(see Figure 1). Responding to stimulus 1 by pressing the left
key (R1) led to color A (O1) while pressing the right key
(R2) led to color B (O2). For stimulus 2 this was inverted:
Pressing the left key (R1) led to color B (O2), pressing the
right key (R2) to color A (O1). This was the case for both
the outcome-based and the stimulus-based condition. Hence,
there was a perfect contingency between a response in a
situation and the resulting outcome in both conditions. At
the same time, there was no systematic relationship between
stimuli and responses or stimuli and outcomes. Thereby we
could avoid confounding S-R-O contingency with S-R or S-O
contingencies. In a control condition outcomes were delivered
randomly. Here, pressing a specific key in response to specific
stimulus could lead to two different outcomes with the same
probability and hence no S-R-O contingency representation
could be formed.
Manipulation of Outcome-Based Response Selection
The second manipulation referred to the way the response was
chosen. As each stimulus implied two response options (cf.
Figure 1), additional information was required to resolve these
ambiguous S-R rules. Crucially, S-R rule ambiguity was resolved
differently based on two different types of cues preceding the
stimulus. In the outcome-based condition the cues were colored
frames signaling which future color outcome was to be produced
by responding to the stimuli. This promoted the usage of the
FIGURE 1 | Example of the hierarchical relationship between stimuli,
responses and outcomes. The contingency between response and
outcome in situation 1 (as indicated by stimulus 1) was inverted in situation 2
(stimulus 2).
acquired S-R-O representations. By contrast, in the stimulus-
based condition and in the control condition the cues were
different frame patterns that indicated which S-R rule to apply
in the current trial and made no reference to the outcome.
Hence, in the outcome-based condition response selection was
controlled by a rule emphasizing the desired outcome, while
in both the stimulus-based condition and the control condition
response selection was controlled by a rule emphasizing the
stimulus.
Prior to the experiment the tasks were instructed either in
terms of S-O-R relationships—in the outcome-based condition
(In the presence of stimulus 1, to get O1 perform R1 and to get
O2 perform R2; In the presence of stimulus 2 to get O1 perform
R2 and to get O2 perform R1), or in terms of S-R rules—in
the stimulus-based and control conditions (Rule 1: If stimulus
1 appears, perform R1, if stimulus 2 appears perform R2; Rule 2:
If stimulus 1 appears press R2, if stimulus 2 appears press R1, see
Figure 2).
In previous behavioral studies we have addressed the
question whether this paradigm indeed renders only actions
in the outcome-based but not in the stimulus-based condition
controlled by the outcome (Zwosta et al., 2013). In these
experiments we used the same paradigm except that the outcome
location could be either compatible or incompatible to the
response location. Differences in response times for spatially
compatible and incompatible trials indicate that the outcome
(appearing after the response) must have been anticipated during
response selection and hence, response selection was guided
by the anticipated outcome. This effect was observed only
for the outcome-based condition, but not for both stimulus-
based and control conditions indicating that only the outcome-
based instruction leads to outcome anticipation during response
selection and thus a goal-directed action control mode. Hence,
we could make sure that actions are controlled by their outcomes
only in the outcome-based condition. Furthermore, we could
demonstrate that the action control mode was not transferred
from one condition block to the next. We did not include
this manipulation of spatial R-O compatibility in the present
fMRI study because otherwise neural correlates of response-
outcome interference and outcome anticipation would have been
confounded.
FIGURE 2 | Instructions for each of the three conditions prior to the
experiment. S: Stimulus, R: Response, O: Outcome.
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FIGURE 3 | Examples of trial procedures with correct responses for the three experimental conditions. RT: Response time, R: Response.
Trial Procedure
The trial procedure was identical for all three conditions except
for cue type and outcome contingency (see Figure 3). Each
trial started with a fixation cross displayed at the center of
the screen for 500 ms. This was replaced by the cue frame
presented for 700 ms which indicated which one of the two
outcomes should be produced (in the outcome-based condition)
or which one of the two S-R rules should be applied (in the
stimulus-based and the control conditions). Afterwards, the
stimulus appeared in the center of the cue frame for maximally
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2000 ms or until a response was made. If the response was
correct then the background of the stimulus was colored, and
stimulus and color stayed on-screen for 1000 ms. Importantly, in
outcome- and stimulus-based conditions, the color was chosen
according to the respective hierarchical S-R-O scheme while
in the control condition one of two colors was chosen at
random. If the response was incorrect then the word ‘‘wrong’’
appeared in the center and the background turned to the
alternative color, thus keeping the S-R-O contingency intact. If
no response was made then ‘‘too slow’’ was displayed leading to
no outcome color.
Stimuli
For each condition a unique pair of stimuli and outcome colors
was used. These three pairs of black-and-white stimulus pictures
as well as three pairs of outcome colors were randomly assigned
to the three conditions. All stimuli were taken from the Creative
Symbol Collection of Matton Images. Responses were made with
the index fingers of the left and the right hand. Cues for the
outcome-based condition consisted of colored square frames that
indicated the outcome color that was to be produced. For the
conditions with stimulus-based instructions the cues consisted of
black or white square frames that indicated which rule to apply.
For one of the two conditions the lines of the square frames were
solid while for the other one they were dashed.
Experimental Procedure
The experiment consisted of a practice phase outside of the
scanner in order to make subjects familiar with the tasks and
ensure a sufficiently low error rate. This was then followed
by the main fMRI experiment. The three conditions alternated
within a block design which provides optimal statistical power
(Friston et al., 1999), and hence the possibility to detect
subtle differences between the conditions, and is well-suited to
investigate differences in functional connectivity (Gitelman et al.,
2003).
Pre-Experimental Instruction and Practice
During the practice phase subjects were seated in a separate room
and learned the conditions in separate blocks. The order of the
conditions was balanced across participants.
In the outcome-based condition, the two-step instruction
procedure started with a display showing the first stimulus and
the two outcome colors that would be produced by pressing
the left and right key respectively. This was followed by eight
trials including only the first stimulus. Afterwards, the same
procedure was repeated for the second stimulus, which was
followed by 32 intermixed trials containing either one of the
stimuli. For the stimulus-based and the control conditions, the
two-step instruction procedure started with a display showing
the two stimuli and which response to make after them when
S-R rule 1 was to be applied. Accordingly, after eight practice
trials the second S-R rule was instructed. Again, thereafter,
32 intermixed trials containing either one of the two rules
were presented. When all three conditions were instructed
following this procedure, the final practice phase started which
matched the proper experiment. It comprised three blocks of
16 trials for each condition, which were separated by a display
saying ‘‘the next block is about to start’’ for 3000 ms. During
practice, error trials were repeated until a correct response was
made. Otherwise, trial timing was identical to the main fMRI
experiment.
fMRI Experiment
The main fMRI experiment started with a display showing
a summary of the instructions for each condition. After this
there were three runs each containing nine task blocks with
16 trials. Between the task blocks there was a 30 s baseline
during which a fixation cross was presented. After 29 s the
cross shortly disappeared for 500 ms indicating that the next
block was about to start. The order of the condition blocks
was randomized with the constraint that each run started
with another condition and that transition frequencies were
balanced. A unique randomization was used for each participant.
One block lasted about 45 s depending on the individual
response speed.
Imaging Procedure
MRI data were acquired on a Siemens 3T whole body Trio
System (Erlangen, Germany) with a 16 channel head coil. Ear
plugs dampened scanner noise. Before the experiment started,
structural images were acquired using a T1-weighted sequence
(TR = 1900 ms, TE = 2.26 ms, TI = 900 ms, flip = 9◦) with a
resolution of 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm. Functional images were
acquired using a gradient echo planar sequence (TR = 2000 ms,
TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 80◦). Each volume contained 32 slices
that were measured in ascending order. The voxel size was 4 mm
× 4 mm × 4 mm (gap: 20%). The experiment was controlled by
E-Prime 2.0.
Data Analysis
The fMRI data were analyzed using SPM8 based on MATLAB
7.14. First, the functional images were spatially realigned
and unwarped. Each participant’s structural image was co-
registered to the mean functional image and segmented. Spatial
normalization to MNI space was performed using DARTEL with
a spatial resolution of 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm. Images were
then smoothed with a Gaussian Kernel of 8 mm full-width at half
maximum.
Standard Univariate Analysis
Data analysis was performed using the General Linear Model
(GLM) approach implemented in SPM8. We modeled each
condition block (approximately 45 s, depending on the individual
response speed) by a boxcar function convolved with SPM
canonical HRF. We included one regressor per condition and
run which amounted to nine regressors (three conditions
in three runs). Each run contained three blocks of each
condition and the baseline was modeled implicitly. The high
pass filter was set to 1/180 Hz. For each subject contrast
images were generated for all pairs of the three conditions.
Differences between the conditions were then analyzed on
the group level using one-sample t-tests. In addition to the
whole brain analysis, we conducted ROI analyses for the
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angular gyrus, the caudate nucleus, the hippocampus, the OFC,
the cerebellum, the SMA and the ACC based on previous
results (Elsner et al., 2002; Tricomi et al., 2004, 2009; Yin
and Knowlton, 2006; Melcher et al., 2008, 2013; Balleine
et al., 2009; Desmurget et al., 2009; Noonan et al., 2011;
Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2013). All anatomical ROIs were
derived from the automatic anatomic labeling atlas (AAL).
Correction for multiple comparisons was done by determining
the number of voxels necessary to meet a cluster-corrected
threshold of p < 0.05 through AfNi’s Monte Carlo Simulations
(3dClustSim) with the initial voxel-wise threshold set to
p< 0.001.
PPI Analysis
In order to assess differences in functional connectivity between
the conditions we conducted a psycho-physiological interaction
(PPI) analysis as implemented in SPM8, using a sphere of 6 mm
around the peak voxel coordinate in the right angular gyrus
that showed stronger activation in outcome-based and stimulus-
based blocks compared to the control condition (MNI seed
coordinates: 45, −57, 33). Differences in functional connectivity
were again computed for the contrasts between all pairs of
conditions. Significance was set to cluster-corrected p < 0.05
based on Monte Carlo simulations. Additionally, we performed
an exploratory analysis reporting clusters with a more lenient
cluster size of 20 voxels with the voxel-based threshold set to
p< 0.001.
Results
Behavioral Results
Figure 4 depicts error rates and response times for the conditions
in the course of the experiment. Response times and error
rates were analyzed separately for the practice phase and fMRI
experiment using a repeated measures ANOVA with condition
as a within-subject factor.
Practice
Due to technical problems behavioral data of the practice phase
was lost for two subjects. Analyses revealed no differences
in error rates between the conditions, F < 1. However, RTs
were influenced by the experimental conditions, F(2,64) = 6.82,
p = 0.001. Subjects’ responses were slower in the outcome-
based condition compared to the stimulus-based and control
conditions, t(30) = 2.70, p = 0.011 and t(30) = 3.18, p = 0.003,
respectively. RTs between the stimulus-based and the control
conditions did not differ, t < 1, which indicates that subjects
did neither benefit nor suffer from contingent outcomes in the
stimulus-based condition.
fMRI Experiment
The practice-related behavioral differences were no longer
present during the fMRI experiment: There were no
significant differences between the three experimental
conditions in either RT or error rate (Fs < 1). Participants
were able to perform the tasks in an accurate and timely
manner: Mean error rate was 4.2% (SE: 0.6%, range
0.5–11.6%) and mean RT in correct trials was 613 ms (SE:
19 ms). Accordingly, brain activation differences cannot
be attributed to performance level differences between the
conditions.
Imaging Results
Standard Univariate Analysis
Results of the univariate analysis are summarized in Table 1.
Whole brain analysis revealed significantly stronger activation in
outcome-based blocks compared to control blocks only in the
right angular gyrus (see Figure 5A), as well as in the medial
occipital cortex. Additional ROI analyses revealed stronger
activity only in the left angular gyrus but in no other pre-defined
ROI. None of the other contrasts, including the comparison
between outcome-based and stimulus-based conditions, revealed
significant differences in activation.
In order to determine whether the activation difference
we found in the specific part of the angular gyrus between
the outcome-based and the control condition was due to
mere representation or actual usage of S-R-O contingencies,
we computed two directed pair-wise comparisons on the
condition-specific activation estimates (stimulus-based
> control, stimulus-based < outcome-based). If angular
gyrus activity was related to the presence of an S-R-O
representation, then it should be higher in the stimulus-
based condition than the control condition but should not
differ between the outcome-based and the stimulus-based
condition. If, instead, angular gyrus activity was primarily
driven by the usage of S-R-O representations, activity
in the stimulus-based condition should be similar to the
control condition and smaller than in the outcome-based
condition.
In order to ensure that ROI definition was independent of
value extraction, and thus to avoid circular analysis (Kriegeskorte
et al., 2009) we applied the leave-one-subject-out method
(Esterman et al., 2010). Activation values for each subject
were extracted from a ROI derived from data from the
rest of the subjects. Thus, for each subject we calculated
the group-based contrast between the outcome-based and the
control condition without this subject. Then we determined
the largest cluster with its peak voxel within the anatomical
boundaries of the right angular gyrus at a voxel-based threshold
of p < 0.001. Notably, for each of the 33 ROIs the peak
voxel was always identical to the peak voxel in the whole-
group analysis while cluster sizes ranged from 34 to 91
voxels (mean: 57 voxels). Finally, for the remaining subject
we extracted the mean activation values of the voxels within
TABLE 1 | Summary of the results of the univariate analysis.
Region MNI Coordinates Tmax Cluster size
Outcome-based > Control
R Angular gyrus 45 −57 33 4.581 69
L Angular gyrus −57 −63 24 3.492 9
R Occipital lobe 9 −81 24 4.051 87
No other contrast yielded any significant results.
1Whole-brain cluster-corrected for multiple comparisons p < 0.05, 2Cluster-
corrected for multiple comparisons adjusted for the size of the ROI p < 0.05.
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FIGURE 4 | Error rates and response times (RT) for the experimental conditions across the course of the experiment. Each block comprises 16 trials with
the exception of block 1 which consist of 32 trials. Error bars indicate standard errors.
FIGURE 5 | Results of the univariate analysis. (A) Result of the
comparison of brain activation between the outcome-based and the
control condition (cluster-corrected p < 0.05 corresponding to at least
66 adjacent voxels with uncorrected p < 0.001). Activation in the right
angular gyrus was significantly higher during outcome-based blocks.
(B) BOLD estimates for each of the conditions within the angular gyrus
ROIs derived from a leave-one-subject-out analysis. Error bars reflect
standard errors.
this cluster for each of the three conditions compared to
baseline.
Figure 5B shows the resulting activation estimates separately
for each condition as compared to the implicit fixation baseline.
The pair-wise comparisons of interest showed that activation
in the stimulus-based condition was significantly higher than
in the control condition t(32) = 1.78, p = 0.042 (Bonferroni-
corrected for two comparisons, one-sided). The difference
between outcome-based and stimulus-based conditions was not
significant, t(32) = 1.10, p = 0.139 (Bonferroni-corrected for
two comparisons, one-sided). This suggests that angular gyrus
activity is related to S-R-O representation. Of note, the activation
estimates for the stimulus-based condition were numerically in
between the outcome-based and the control condition. While
the significant difference between stimulus-based and control
condition clearly demonstrates that the mere representation
of S-R-O contingencies is sufficient to elicit enhanced activity
in the angular gyrus, the non-significant difference between
stimulus-based and outcome-based conditions calls for a
more cautious interpretation. While in the present sample
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of N = 33, the usage of these representations did not
additionally boost angular gyrus activation, such an arguably
more subtle increase might be detected with more statistical
power.
PPI Results
Results of the PPI analysis are summarized in Table 2.
Condition-dependent differences in functional connectivity of
the right angular gyrus were found for the comparisons
between outcome-based and stimulus-based as well as between
outcome-based and control conditions. Specifically, in the
outcome-based condition compared to both other conditions,
an increased functional connectivity between the right angular
gyrus and specific cortical and subcortical areas was revealed.
All other comparisons between conditions did not yield
any reliable results (less than 10 contiguous voxels with
p< 0.001).
Outcome-based condition> stimulus-based condition
The results are shown in Figure 6. Whole-brain analysis
resulted in stronger connectivity between the right angular
gyrus and clusters in both hippocampi and the right occipital
lobe. Moreover, ROI analyses revealed stronger functional
connectivity between the right angular gyrus and the caudate
head bilaterally, right lateral OFC (two adjacent clusters) and
cerebellum. The exploratory analysis, based on at least 20
adjacent voxels with p < 0.001, furthermore yielded a cluster in
the left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC) and a cluster in
the superior parietal lobe (SPL) as well as an additional cluster
TABLE 2 | Summary of the PPI results.
Region MNI Coordinates Tmax Cluster size
Outcome-based > Stimulus-based
R Hippocampus 21 −33 0 4.941 72
L Hippocampus −21 −33 3 4.371 60
R Caudate head 6 15 3 3.792 12
L Caudate head −6 12 9 4.092 10
R Lateral OFC 36 24 −18 4.132 30
R Lateral OFC 48 27 −6 3.872 11
R Occipital lobe 30 −90 −6 4.161 117
R Occipital lobe 18 −66 24 4.483 23
Cerebellum −30 −78 51 4.552 46
Cerebellum 0 −48 −36 4.492 28
L RLPFC −36 54 12 4.383 44
L SPL −21 −66 48 3.953 42
Outcome-based > Control
R Caudate head 6 15 6 4.932 15
L Caudate head −15 18 0 3.662 6
R Occipital lobe 30 −93 12 5.261 100
Cerebellum 3 −54 −9 4.052 24
L Occipital lobe −9 −102 0 4.123 49
(L RLPFC) −39 57 12 (3.77) 8
Stimulus-based> Control: no significant results (overall 8 voxels with p< 0.001,
uncorrected).
1Whole-brain cluster-corrected for multiple comparisons p < 0.05, 2Cluster-
corrected for multiple comparisons adjusted for the size of the ROI p< 0.05, 3more
than 20 adjacent voxels with uncorrected p < 0.001.
in the right occipital lobe. However, there were no voxels in the
SMA or ACC with an uncorrected p< 0.001.
Outcome-based condition> control condition
Similar results were found for the comparison between the
outcome-based and control condition (see Table 2).Whole-brain
analysis yielded significantly stronger connectivity to the right
occipital lobe. ROI analyses identified clusters in bilateral caudate
head and the cerebellum. Again, there was a tendency towards
stronger activation in the left RLPFC which did however, not
reach corrected significance (Tmax = 3.89, 8 adjacent voxels with
p< 0.001).
Together, the increased functional connectivity of the
angular gyrus in the outcome-based condition compared to
both the stimulus-based and the control conditions and the
absence of a difference in functional connectivity between the
latter two conditions indicates that these functional couplings
reflect neural mechanisms related to outcome-based response
selection.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate the neural
basis of two components of goal-directed behavior: the
representation of S-R-O contingencies and their actual usage
in outcome-based response selection, i.e., the choice of actions
according to their anticipated outcomes. To this end we
compared an outcome-based condition where people were
instructed to produce a specific outcome with a stimulus-based
condition where people were instructed to respond according
to stimulus-response rules and a control condition with random
outcomes.
We found that if outcomes were contingent on responses
to stimuli (i.e., in the outcome-based and stimulus-based
condition), activity in the right angular gyrus was stronger
than in the control condition with random action outcomes.
Furthermore, the actual integration of outcomes into response
planning, revealed by comparing outcome-based and stimulus-
based conditions, was accompanied by increased functional
connectivity between the angular gyrus and hippocampus,
caudate head, lateral OFC, cerebellum and, at a more lenient
threshold, also RLPFC.
Hence, the theoretical and empirical notion that,
while the representation of stimulus-response-outcome
contingencies is a prerequisite of goal-directed behavior,
these associations are not automatically used to guide behavior
(Pfister et al., 2010; Zwosta et al., 2013) is supported on
the neural level. Our results suggest that these processes
are reflected in a stronger involvement of the angular
gyrus when outcomes are predictable independent of
their usage, while outcome-directed response selection is
additionally associated with stronger functional connectivity
to several brain areas involved in goal-directed action
control.
Note that the aim of this study was not to contrast goal-
directed and habitual behavior but to isolate two distinct
aspects of goal-directed behavior. Hence, all conditions can
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 180
Zwosta et al. Neural mechanisms of goal-directed behavior
FIGURE 6 | Results of the PPI analysis with stronger functional
connectivity to the right angular gyrus in the outcome-based
condition compared to the stimulus-based condition.
(A) Clusters with at least 20 adjacent voxels with uncorrected
p < 0.001. (B) Anatomical caudate ROI, voxels with uncorrected
p < 0.001.
be considered goal-directed to some degree, as participants
were motivated to press the correct response and to avoid
errors. Furthermore, as the conditions did not differ in the
number of repetitions of cue-stimulus-response pairings,
we would not expect differences in habitualization. Instead,
the critical difference between the outcome-based and
the stimulus-based condition was the explicit integration
of the (non-incentive) specific outcome into response
selection.
Representation of S-R-O Associations
A first main finding of the present study is that the angular
gyrus plays a central role in relating sensory outcomes to
actions in a certain situation. Activity in the angular gyrus was
higher whenever specific action outcomes were predictable.
This is consistent with its previous characterization as an
integration zone of bottom-up and top-down processes
which is involved in a multitude of cognitive functions
(Seghier, 2013). In the context of action outcomes, it was
previously argued that the angular gyrus plays a central
role in predictive coding by comparing intended to actual
action outcomes: It was found to be more strongly activated
when predictions are not met, thus signaling expectancy-
incongruent events (Sirigu et al., 2004; Farrer et al., 2008;
Spengler et al., 2009; Liljeholm et al., 2011; Seghier, 2013).
In contrast, we find that the angular gyrus is more strongly
involved when expectancies about outcomes exist, even if
these are always fulfilled, compared to a control condition
with unpredictable outcomes. Hence, we suggest that the
angular gyrus is generally involved when predictions can be
made about the outcomes of actions, by representing action-
outcome contingencies, and not only when these predictions are
violated.
Outcome-Based Response Selection
Our results further suggest that outcome-based action control is
relying on the functional coupling of the angular gyrus with other
prefrontal, subcortical and cerebellar areas. Hence, while the
conditions did not differ regarding activity in either of the goal-
directed brain areas, functional connectivity of the angular gyrus
with the goal-directed network was enhanced in the outcome-
based condition.
The notion that outcome-based response selection
is not reflected in activation differences but instead in
differences in functional connectivity is in line with
previous findings on initial learning processes of action
contingent outcomes (Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2013),
instrumental trial and error learning processes (Li et al.,
2011), and reward processing (Camara et al., 2009)
and seems to be a rather general feature of large-scale
functional integration in the brain (Cross and Iacoboni,
2013).
The involvement of the angular gyrus in intentional
actions is corroborated by findings that relate lesions in
this particular area with deficits in awareness of intention
(Sirigu et al., 2004) as well as a study demonstrating that
electrical stimulation of the angular gyrus leads to patients
reporting motor intentions (Desmurget et al., 2009). Our
results further specify the role of this brain structure in
goal-directed behavior by showing that its true importance
is related to the actual usage of learnt stimulus-response-
outcome representations and emerges via large-scale functional
couplings with specific brain areas, notably hippocampus,
caudate head, lateral OFC, cerebellum and RLPFC. Some
suggestions for the possible functions of these couplings are
made in the following paragraphs. Of course in using a
blocked design that is well suited to investigate functional
connectivity, we can only speculate at which phase of
a trial the reported differences occurred. The attribution
of the results to temporal subprocesses is an important
task of itself that should definitely be addressed in future
studies.
Previous studies have already suggested an involvement of
the hippocampus in learning and retrieval of action-outcome
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relationships (Melcher et al., 2008, 2013). Moreover, successful
recollection of episodic memory content engages a hippocampal-
parietal memory network as revealed by resting state connectivity
analysis (Vincent et al., 2006). Given that the angular gyrus
is involved in the representation of stimulus-response-outcome
contingencies, functional connectivity to the hippocampusmight
reflect the explicit retrieval of these contingencies in order
to select the appropriate response to produce the desired
outcome.
The functional connectivity between angular gyrus and
caudate head might reflect a more implicit part of outcome-
based response selection. The anterior caudate was found
to be more active during early instrumental behavior, but
decreased as the action became more habitual, i.e., independent
of the outcome (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine et al.,
2009).
Another area that is typically found to be involved in goal-
directed behavior is the OFC. In particular, the lateral OFC was
previously found to be involved in associating a specific (valued)
outcome with a stimulus (Walton et al., 2010; Rushworth
et al., 2011; Noonan et al., 2012). In case of outcome-based
response planning this might reflect the assignment of a value
to the desired outcome, thereby choosing the goal that is to be
pursued and enabling switching between the different desired
outcomes.
Furthermore, we found increased coupling of the angular
gyrus to the cerebellum. Just as the angular gyrus, also the
cerebellum is associated with predictive coding (Blakemore et al.,
2001). However, while the angular gyrus was associated with
conscious prediction of action consequences, cerebellum
was suggested to be involved in the implicit prediction
of sensory events resulting from actions (Blakemore and
Sirigu, 2003; Sirigu et al., 2004). The observed stronger
connectivity between angular gyrus and cerebellum in the
outcome-based condition might thus indicate a stronger
guidance of anticipatory cerebellar processes by conscious
action-outcome expectation processes supported by the
angular gyrus.
Additionally, there was a tendency towards stronger
functional connectivity to left rostrolateral PFC (RLPFC).
While this area is not part of the typical brain network
engaged in goal-directed behavior, it is usually involved
when multiple operations have to be coordinated (Ramnani
and Owen, 2004), in prospective memory tasks as well as
when an alternative task set is kept in mind during the
performance of the ongoing task (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007).
As the present experiment required the maintenance of
two S-R rules in order to elicit one outcome, we speculate
that RLPFC engagement could reflect coordination of
those simultaneous rules (see also Wolfensteller and von
Cramon, 2010). Hence, one suggestion would be that coupling
between angular gyrus and RLPFC reflects the hierarchical
contextualization of response-outcome associations in the
present experiment.
Finally, in studies investigating intentional goal-directed
behavior by comparing free-choice to forced-choice actions,
the former are usually found to lead to stronger activation
in the pre-SMA and dorsal ACC/RZC (e.g., Lau et al., 2004;
Mueller et al., 2007) which led to the assumption that the
medial frontal cortex is central to intentional action control.
Free-choice actions are, however, confounded with conflict
resolution as they require a choice between multiple competing
response options (Brass and Haggard, 2008). Using only
forced-choice tasks we did not find any involvement of pre-
SMA or ACC even at a lenient threshold. However, Noonan
et al. (2011) found that ACC activity correlated with the
probability of correct response selection when actions were
followed by specific outcomes which implies an involvement
in outcome-based response selection. A possible explanation
for why we do not find ACC involvement neither in the
univariate analysis nor in the PPI analysis might be that
we investigated outcome-based response selection after S-R
rules were explicitly instructed and participants had practiced
them. In contrast, in the study conducted by Noonan
et al. (2011) participants were still acquiring S-R rules,
and interestingly, the correlation between ACC activity and
performance substantially diminishes when higher performance
levels matching the ones in our study are reached. Together,
this might indicate that ACC is primarily involved when there
is still a certain ambiguity about which response leads to
the desired outcome. Hence, while keeping in mind that null
results can only be interpreted with caution we tentatively
suggest that the ACC and pre-SMA might not be involved
in the usage of S-R-O representations for action selection
per se but when using them for related processes such as
e.g., conflict resolution or performance monitoring during
learning.
Interestingly, while we used outcomes that are not
intrinsically valuable but assigned motivational relevance
to them through instruction, many of the areas we found
to be connected to the angular gyrus are also frequently
reported in studies using inherently valuable outcomes.
This might suggest that their involvement is independent
of intrinsic outcome value and fits Daniel and Pollmann
(2010) findings that monetary rewards and positive cognitive
feedback (correct answer) recruit largely the same brain
structures. Also, similar regions were reported in studies on
rapid (non-hierarchical) S-R-O learning where outcomes
were intrinsically non-incentive as in the present study
(Ruge and Wolfensteller, 2013, 2014). On the other hand,
we did not find an involvement of the medial frontal areas
which are often reported in studies employing rewarding
outcomes. In the future, a systematic comparison between
the differences and commonalities in processes aiming at
intrinsically rewarding vs. abstract outcomes could clarify this
issue.
Conclusion
Together our results support the distinction between
representing stimulus-response-outcome contingencies on
the one hand and using those representations in the sense
of outcome-based response selection on the other hand.
Our results suggest that the angular gyrus plays a central
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role in relating actions in to their sensory outcomes. The
actual usage of these representations, such as when explicitly
choosing actions according to outcomes, seems to rely on
increased functional coupling of the angular gyrus with
subcortical as well as prefrontal and cerebellar areas that
are engaged in both explicit and implicit processes of action
control.
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